Good negotiations trade value instead of slowly surrendering margin.

There is a moment in almost every large deal when the customer asks for something “small.”

A little more discount.

Free transition support.

An extra reporting commitment.

A shorter termination window.

The request is usually delivered politely, often near the end, when the sales team can already see the finish line.

That is when otherwise disciplined sellers start giving things away.

The logic feels reasonable: we have come this far, the deal is important, and we do not want one issue to hold up the signature.

So we concede.

Then the customer asks for something else.

That should not surprise us. The first concession did more than change the commercial position. It taught the customer how the negotiation works.

Every concession establishes a precedent for what the next request might produce.

A concession without an exchange is not collaboration. It is a signal that more value may be available if the buyer keeps asking.

Imagine a five-year managed-services deal. Procurement asks for an eight-percent reduction to reach its savings target. Sales agrees, hoping to preserve momentum.

Legal then asks the supplier to absorb additional transition risk. Operations wants service credits tightened. Finance wants payment terms extended. Each request is discussed separately, so each one seems manageable.

By the time the agreement is signed, the solution is carrying less revenue, more risk, slower cash, and obligations that delivery did not price.

The customer may feel they negotiated well.

The salesperson may still celebrate the win.

The sales leader inherits weaker economics. Delivery inherits promises with less room to recover when reality becomes messy. The organization may spend years protecting a margin that disappeared in the final weeks of the pursuit.

And the customer is not necessarily better served. When a provider enters delivery with inadequate capacity, compressed transition funding, or unrealistic commitments, the commercial victory can become an operational disappointment.

This is why I have always viewed negotiation as value exchange rather than a contest over who gives in last.

If the customer needs a lower price, what can change with it?

Longer term. Different payment timing. Reduced scope. Faster access to data and people. A joint reference. A firmer volume commitment. Shared responsibility for a dependency.

The answer will vary. The principle should not.

Movement on one side should create movement on the other.

A negotiated price works only when the operating conditions can still support the promise.

There is a practical buyer-psychology point here, but it does not require gamesmanship. People use the other party’s behaviour to judge whether a position is real. If the seller repeatedly moves without receiving anything in return, the buyer may reasonably conclude that the earlier position was never firm.

That weakens trust as much as it weakens price.

The best negotiators are not rigid. They are clear.

They understand what matters to the customer, what each concession costs, what can be traded, and where flexibility ends. They do not protect margin by becoming defensive. They protect value by making the exchange visible.

A good agreement should leave both sides able to explain what they received—and what they committed in return.

Otherwise, the seller may win the signature while quietly negotiating away the conditions required to deliver the promise.

What did your organization receive in exchange for the last concession it made?

If you are navigating a complex negotiation and want to pressure-test the value exchange, reach out. I’m always happy to compare notes.